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Alstonian Justification Revisited 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I presented an Alstonian version of the par­
ity thesis as well as a challenge to it. I turn now to consider the 
arguments of several of Alston's more recent essays. In particular I 
concentrate on those aspects of his thought in which he delineates 
his more considered account of epistemic justification as well as the 
claim that one can be justified in believing that an epistemic prac­
tice is reliable. My argument is that the claims of these later essays 
on epistemic justification challenge those of the earlier, raising 
again the question of the parity thesis: do sense perceptual beliefs 
and the practice that generates them have the same epistemic status 
as theistic beliefs and the practice that generates them?1 
1. A warning is needed here. Alston's essays with which I deal in this chapter 
make several terminological and substantive shifts from "Christian Experience and 
Christian Belief." Although I believe the development of Alston's thought to be 
quite consistent, with a clear and fundamentally unchanging understanding of epi­
stemic justification and rationality, his use of terms and emphasis do change occa­
sionally. I attempt to keep the shifts straight and to do so I introduce, by way of 
suggestion, where I believe his terms and their references overlap. When it is not 
clearly possible to do so, I note that and let Alston's usage stand while atttempting 
to work around any unclarity to which so doing gives rise. 
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1. Epistemic Justification Again 
In "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" Alston delineates two 
different kinds, and several subkinds, of epistemic justification. 
The broad categories for that discussion are what he calls "deon­
tological epistemic justification" and "evaluative epistemic justifica­
tion": 
Deontological Epistemic Justification (Jd): S is Jd in be­
lieving that p if and only if in believing that p S is not 
violating any epistemic obligations. 
Evaluative Epistemic Justification Ue): S is Je in believing 
that p if and only if S's believing that p, as S does, is a 
good thing from the epistemic point of view. 
The "as S does" in the second account is intended to call attention 
to the particularity of this believing rather than believings of p un­
der any conditions. 
In a note, Alston points out that he was convinced by Alvin 
Plantinga that "deontological, " rather than "normative, " is a more 
accurate term for what Alston strives to describe in the first ac­
count above. This suggests that his account of deontological justi­
fication is an extension of the accounts of normative justification 
provided in his earlier essay. To avoid bogging down in exegetical 
arguments about shifts in terminology, I simply present Alston's 
arguments in the new terminology. Thus, in the remainder of this 
section I spell out in further detail Alston's accounts of ]d and Je, 
and related issues, returning later to consider his explanation of 
how a person can be justified in believing that an epistemic practice 
is reliable. 
Alston rejects the claim that ]d. or any version of it, is the best 
understanding of justification from the epistemic point of view. To 
understand the central point of Alston's argument against ]d, it is 
best if we get before us what he takes to be the strongest candidate 
from among the deontological competitors for epistemic justifica­
tion. After rejecting a voluntarist account of ]d (because most of 
our beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control), he suggests 
Rationality and Theistic Belief 
two possible accounts of an involuntarist ]d· 2 The first, where the 
subscript "i" stands for "involuntary": 
Involuntary ]d Od;): S is ]di in believing that p at t if and 
only if there are no intellectual obligations that (1) have to 
do with the kind of belief-forming or sustaining habit the 
activation of which resulted in S' s believing that p at t, or 
with the particular process of belief formation or suste­
nance that was involved in S's believing that p at t, and 
(2) which are such that (a) Shad those obligations prior to 
t; (b) S did not fulfill those obligations; and (c) if S had 
fulfilled those obligations, S would not have believed that 
p at t. 
The second is the same as the first, but (c) is replaced, for reasons I 
leave up to the reader to fill in, by 
(c') if S had fulfilled those obligations, then S's belief­
forming habits would have changed, or S's access to rele­
vant adverse considerations would have changed, in such 
a way that S would not have believed that p at t. 
Alston rejects the deontological understanding of epistemic justi­
fication, for "Jdi does not give us what we expect . . . . The most 
serious defect is that it does not hook up in the right way with an 
adequate, truth-conducive ground. " In other words, "I may have 
done what could reasonably be expected of me in the management 
and cultivation of my doxastic life, and still hold a belief on outra­
geously inadequate grounds. " There are several possible sources of 
this discrepancy. One might have grown up in "cultural isolation, " 
following the noetic leadership of the authorities of one's tribe and 
not having any reasons to reject their authority as reliable. Yet the 
tradition of the tribe might be very poor reason for believing that 
p. Or one might be deficient in cognitive powers or have poor 
training one lacks the time or resources to overcome. Alston 
writes: 
What this spread of cases brings out is that ]di is not sufficient for 
epistemic justification; we may have done the best we can, or at 
least the best that could reasonably be expected of us, and still be in 
2. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," pp. 89, 94, 95, 99· 
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a very poor epistemic position in believing that p; we could, blame­
lessly, be believing p for outrageously bad reasons. Even though )di 
is the closest we can come to a deontological concept of epistemic 
justification if belief is not under direct voluntary control, it still 
does not give us what we are looking for. 
So Alston rejects deontological justification as the best understand­
ing of epistemic justification; it falls short of what is wanted from 
the epistemic point of view. 3 
What account of Je does Alston give in "Concepts of Epistemic 
Justification"? Here Je is an internalist notion with an externalist 
constraint. Consider the internalist aspect first. There are, says Al­
ston, two popular ideas about what internalism is. The first takes 
justification to be internal in that "it depends on what support is 
available for the belief from 'within the subject's perspective, ' in 
the sense of what the subject knows or justifiably believes about 
the world. " The second "takes the 'subject's perspective' to include 
whatever is 'directly accessible' to the subject, accessible just on the 
basis of reflection. " To these readings Alston adds a third that con­
trasts with both as well as with reliabilist understandings of justi­
fication: "What I take to be internal about justification is that 
whether a belief is justified depends on what it is based on 
(grounds); and grounds must be other psychological state(s) of the 
same subject. " He continues: "So in taking it to be conceptually 
true that one is justified in believing that p iff one's belief that p is 
based on an adequate ground, I take justification to be 'internal' in 
that it depends on the way in which the belief stems from the be­
liever's psychological states, which are 'internal' to the subject in 
an obvious sense. " So Je is an internalist notion. 4 
In "lnternalism and Externalism in Epistemology" Alston fur­
ther develops these notions, labeling the first "perspectival internal-
J. Ibid. , pp. 95-96. See Alston, "The Deontological Concept of Epistemic 
Justification," in Epistemic Justification (originally in Philosophical Perspectives 2 
(1988]: 257-99), for an extended discussion of his rejection of deontological con­
cepts of epistemic justification as the central notion of justification given the epi­
stemic point of view. 
4· Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 107. This is in contrast to 
Je as Alston describes it elsewhere. In "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," 
p. II5, he claims that Je might, when all the hard work is done, boil down to a 
kind of reliabilist understanding of rationality. His more considered judgment does 
not, however, ignore reliability, as the next few paragraphs delineate. See note 7 
for more detail. 
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ism" (PI) and the second "access internalism" (AI). 5 The relation­
ship between the two, Alston says, is that "we can think of AI as a 
broadening of PI. Whereas PI restricts justifiers to what the subject 
already justifiably believes . . .  AI enlarges that to include what the 
subject can come to know just on reflection . . . .  AI, we might say, 
enlarges the conception of the subject's perspective to include not 
only what does in fact occur in that perspective . . .  but also what 
could be there if the subject were to turn his attention to it. " Alston 
has serious reservations about both PI and AI. He writes that 
the only arguments of any substance that have been advanced [in 
support of PI] proceed from a deontological conception of justifica­
tion and inherit any disabilities that attach to that conception. In­
deed, PI gains significant support only from the most restrictive 
form of a direct voluntary control version of that conception, one 
that is, at best, of limited application to our beliefs. As for AI, the 
arguments in the literature that are designed to establish a direct 
recognizability version [the strongest version where the justifier is 
said to be directly recognizable iff S needs only to reflect clear­
headedly on the question of whether or not the (justifying) fact ob­
tains in order to know that it does] markedly fail to do so! 
Reservations notwithstanding, Alston believes that a moderate 
version of AI can be supported, although along lines very different 
from those he considers and rejects in "Internalism and External­
ism in Epistemology. "7 This moderate version of AI is, I take it, 
5· In "An Intemalist Externalism," p. 233,  Alston adds another type of inter­
nalism, which he calls "consciousness internalism" (CI). CI, Alston argues, has 
"the crushing disability that one can never complete the formulation of a sufficient 
condition for justification. " But we need not concern ourselves with this version of 
internalism here. Although Alston distances his own position in "Concepts of 
Epistemic Justification" from both PI and AI, in "An lnternalist Externalism" and 
in "lntemalism and Externalism in Epistemology" (also in Epistemic Justification; 
originally in Philosophical Topics 14 [ 1986]: 179-221) he identifies his position with 
a "moderate AI. " 
6. Alston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," pp. 214, 224. 
7· In note 4 I called attention to a shift in Alston's description of Je from 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to "Concepts of Epistemic Justifica­
tion." In the former essay, p. 115, he writes that "Sis justified in the evaluative 
sense in holding a certain belief provided that the relevant circumstances in which 
that belief is held are such that the belief is at least likely to be true. In other terms, 
being Jc requires that in the class of actual and possible cases in which beliefs like 
Alstonian Justification Revisited [ 6 5 
a recast understanding of the third account of internalism Alston 
notes in "Concepts of Epistemic Justification"-the account mak­
ing reference to grounds and psychological states. In the moderate 
version of AI, the accessibility of the states that justify beliefs must 
not be so demanding as to be unrealistic or so weak as to include 
too much: 
What is needed here is a concept of something like "fairly direct 
accessibility." In order that justifiers be generally available for pre­
sentation as the legitimizers of the belief, they must be fairly readily 
available to the subject through some mode of access much quicker 
than lengthy research, observation, or experimentation. It seems 
reasonable to follow [Carl] Ginet's lead and suggest that to be a 
justifier an item must be the sort of thing that, in general, a subject 
can explicitly note the presence of just by sufficient reflection on his 
situation. 
Alston goes on to note that he does not know how to make this 
notion more precise. He summarizes by saying that "to be a justi­
fier of a belief, its ground must be the sort of thing whose instances 
are fairly directly accessible to their subject on reflection. "8 
Alston's defense of this internalist requirement comes as an at­
tempt not to prove its necessity but rather to explain the presence 
of the requirement. He says that the reason we have the concept of 
"being justified" in holding a belief flows from the "practice of 
critical reflection on our beliefs, of challenging their credentials and 
responding to such challenges-in short the practice of attempting 
that are or would be held in circumstances like that, the belief is usually true. 
Much needs to be done to work out what kinds of circumstances are relevant, how 
to generalize over beliefs, and so on. Pretending that all that has been done, I 
would like to suggest that what this boils down to is that the way the belief was 
formed and/or is sustained is a generally reliable one, one that can generally be 
relied on to produce true rather than false beliefs. " He continues in a note, p. 133 ,  
n. 4 :  "And not just that the practice has a good track record up to now; rather it is 
a lawlike truth that beliefs formed in accordance with that practice, in those kinds 
of circumstances, are at least likely to be true." Although his more recent work 
does not totally ignore reliabilist considerations, there is an addition to Alston's 
reliabilist demands. Another way of reading these claims, of course, is that the 
second account of Jc is not intended to be a development of the first. Perhaps, 
however, there are too many similarities to make this interpretation likely. 
8. Alston, "An Intemalist Externalism,"  p. 238. 
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to justify our beliefs. "9 Alston is clear that being justified and justi­
fying are not the same thing and argues that the former concept 
was developed in the context of a demand for the latter. Thus the 
AI requirement we all have intuitively is a natural result of the 
social practices in which we engage. Thus epistemic justification is 
intemalist. 
But it carries an extemalist constraint. In "Concepts of Epistemic 
Justification" Alston's concern is to tie the notion of justification to 
the notion of a truth-conducive ground. He writes that "what a 
belief is based on we may term the ground of the belief. A ground, 
in a more dispositional sense of the term, is the sort of item on 
which a belief can be based. " Furthermore, "we want to leave open 
at least the conceptual possibility of direct or immediate justification 
by experience (and perhaps in other ways also), as well as indirect or 
mediate justification by relation to other beliefs (inferentially in the 
most explicit cases). Finally, to say that a subject has adequate 
grounds for her belief that p is to say that she has other justified 
beliefs, or experiences, on which the belief could be based and 
which are strongly indicative of the truth of the belief. "10 So the 
goodness of a belief from the epistemic point of view is its posses­
sion of grounds of this type. Thus his final account of Je, where the 
subscript "g" stands for "grounds":11 
Grounds Je Oeg): S is ]eg in believing that p if and only if 
S's believing that p, as S did, was a good thing from the 
epistemic point of view, in that S's belief that p was based 
on adequate grounds and S lacked sufficient overriding 
reasons to the contrary. 
How is this position extemalist? Alston distances ]eg from a 
straightforwardly reliabilist account of justification. He says that 
"it may be supposed that ]eg as we have explained it, is just re­
liability of belief formation with an evaluative frosting. For where 
a belief is based on adequate grounds that belief has been formed in 
a reliable fashion. " But to take reliability as a criterion of justifica-
9· Ibid. , p. 236. 
ro. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," pp. Ioo-101. 
1 I. Ibid. , p. 1o6. In this context, a beliefs being "based on" another does not 
imply inference; see Alston's discussion on pp. 99-100. 
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tion, or simply to identify justification with reliability, would be 
mistaken. The internalist character of justification blocks any such 
move. Reliable belief formation may occur where the belief is 
formed on some basis outside the believer's psychological states. In 
fact, "I might be so constituted that beliefs about the weather to­
morrow which apparently just 'pop into my mind' out of nowhere 
are in fact reliably produced by a mechanism of which we know 
nothing, and which does not involve the belief being based on any­
thing. Here we would have reliably formed beliefs that are not 
based on adequate grounds. "12 Since a belief could be reliably 
formed but not be internal in the requisite sense, justification and 
reliability are not the same thing. Nevertheless, there is a close 
relationship between reliability and justification. Alston claims 
"that the most adequate concept of epistemic justification is one 
that will put a reliability constraint on principles of epistemic justi­
fication. " He continues: "By a 'reliability constraint' I mean some­
thing like this. Take a principle of justification of the form: 'If a 
belief of type B is based on a ground of type G, then the belief is 
justified.'  This principle is acceptable only if forming a B on the 
basis of a G is a reliable mode of belief formation. On this view, a 
reliability claim is imbedded in every claim to justification. " Thus, 
although reliability and justification are not the same thing, they 
remain intimately connected. 13 
This claim is further explicated and defended in "An Internalist 
Externalism. " Although there are internalist considerations in what 
the grounds for a belief are, Alston rejects the notion that there is 
an internalist restriction on the adequacy (as opposed to the exis­
tence) of grounds for believing. That the adequacy of the grounds 
be internal is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for justi­
fication. Taking necessity first, PI restrictions on adequacy run into 
the difficulty of requiring an infinite hierarchy of justified beliefs, 
for a PI necessary condition would claim something like "one is 
justified in believing that p only if one knows or is justified in 
believing that the ground of that belief is an adequate one. " Since 
no one can fulfill this requirement without having to be justified on 
12. Ibid. , pp. 108-9. 
13. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity" (in Epistemic justification; originally in Philos­
ophy and Phenomenological Research 47 [ 1986]: 1-30), pp. 321-22. 
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every new level, a PI restriction cannot be a necessary one. On the 
other hand, an AI restriction may be construed in this way: "S is 
justified in believing that p only if S is capable, fairly readily on the 
basis of reflection, to acquire a justified belief that the ground of S's 
belief that p is an adequate one. " This fails to be necessary in that, 
although it might be within human capacity to have such justifica­
tion, "it is by no means always the case that the subject of a justi­
fied belief is capable of determining the adequacy of his ground, 
just by careful reflection on the matter, or, indeed, in any other 
way." A weaker AI version falls prey to similar difficulties.14 
What about sufficiency? Since the AI requirement is weaker than 
the PI requirement, it is only necessary, says Alston, to show that 
the PI requirement is not sufficient. The PI version of sufficiency 
for adequacy states: "S's belief that p is based on an accessible 
ground that S is justified in supposing to be adequate. "15 Does this 
version ensure truth conducivity; what notion of justification is to 
be used here? If it is not truth-conducive, the internalist moves 
away from the goals of the epistemic point of view. But it is hard 
to see that one can appeal to a truth-conducive notion without its 
involving an externalist appeal. Perhaps one can shift the question 
to a higher level, but that only weakens the demand momentarily; 
at some level one must return to externalist requirements or lose 
the epistemic point of view by appealing to non-truth-conducive 
grounds. Thus, "in order for my belief that p, which is based on 
ground G, to be justified, it is quite sufficient, as well as necessary, 
that G be sufficiently indicative of the truth of p. It is in no way 
required that I know anything, or be justified in believing any­
thing, about this relationship. No doubt, we sometimes do have 
justified beliefs about the adequacy of our grounds, and that is cer­
tainly a good thing. But that is icing on the cake. " There is, then, 
an externalist constraint on epistemic justification. 16 
]eg is an evaluative concept, it does not require that beliefs be 
within our direct control, it connects belief with the likelihood of 
truth, it permits the grounds for belief to be within the subject's 
cognitive states, and finally it allows for some "disagreement over 
14. Alston, "An Internalist Externalism," pp. 239-40. 
15. Ibid. , p. 242. 
16. Ibid. , pp. 243-44. 
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the precise conditions [of justification] for one or another type of 
belief. "17 Alston concludes that, since ]eg is the only candidate to 
exhibit all these desiderata, it is clearly the winner for best candi­
date for the notion of epistemic justification. 
2. The Justification of Reliability Claims 
My concerns are the nature of epistemic justification and its con­
nection to the reliability of epistemic practices and beliefs about the 
reliability of epistemic practices. In the previous section I sketched 
Alston's account of the former. Since Alston discusses the latter 
issue in two different, albeit overlapping ways, it is best if the two 
approaches are separated. In the remainder of this chapter I deal 
with what I call Alston's "direct approach, " leaving the "doxastic 
practice approach" for Chapter 5. 
The direct approach is found in "Epistemic Circularity. " There 
Alston claims both that one can be justified in reliability claims 
about the procedures and mechanisms by which beliefs are gener­
ated and that one can justify such reliability claims. In fact, he says, 
since reliability claims are imbedded in every claim to justification, 
"what it takes to justify a reliability claim will be at least part of 
what it takes to justify a justification claim. "18 How does Alston 
account for the justification of reliability claims? Relying on the 
distinction between being justified in a belief p and justifying one's 
belief that p, as well as on the notion that some epistemic practices 
are basic epistemic practices, he argues that one can be justified in 
reliability claims about practices by appeal to beliefs generated by 
those practices. This argument involves a kind of circularity in rea­
soning-what he calls "epistemic circularity" -but this is not a 
logical circularity and the justification is not thereby vitiated. 
Taking sense perception as an example of a source of belief, Al­
ston suggests that its reliability cannot be established in a noncir­
cular fashion. As he did in "Christian Experience and Christian 
Belief, " he continues in "Epistemic Circularity" to call sense per­
ception, as well as other epistemic practices (e.g., memory, intro­
spection, and deductive and inductive reasoning), "basic practices"; 
17. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " p. II I. 
r8. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity," p. 322. 
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these are basic sources of belief. He defines basic sources: "0 is an 
(epistemologically) basic source of belief = df. Any (otherwise) 
cogent argument for the reliability of 0 will use premises drawn 
from 0. "19 If sense perception is a basic source or practice, then 
one should expect to find the only means of justifying 
reliability claims about the practice to be arguments containing 
premises generated, at some point, by the practice itself. 
Such arguments are not logically circular, on Alston's account of 
logical circularity as he narrows down that notion. Logical circu­
larity involves the conclusion of an argument figuring among the 
premises. In epistemic circularity, however, what is at stake is not 
the conclusion (such and such a source of belief is reliable) figuring 
in the premises. Rather, it is that certain propositions which are 
true and which are derived from the source shown reliable by the 
argument are, in foct, from the source in question. The conclusion 
itself does not appear in the premises. The issue is the epistemic 
status of the premises. Alston's discussion hinges on the distinction 
between being justified and the activity of justifying. The premises 
are justified, but the conclusion still needs to be justified. Alston 
gives the following example:20 
(1) 1. At lt. S1 formed the perceptual belief thatpt. and p1• 
2.  At t2. S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2• 
Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief. 
Here a large number of perceptual beliefs are laid out, and each 
belief is reported to be true. Supposing that 97 percent of the be­
liefs were true, this inductive argument, says Alston, would allow 
its user to become justified in the belief that sense experience is a 
reliable source of belief. Of course, that sense experience is a reli­
able source of belief nowhere shows up in the premises, for they 
are only reports of the formation of sense beliefs and their truth. 
But the reliability of sense perception is "practically assumed" by 
19. Ibid. , p. 326. 
20. Ibid. , p. 327· 
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the premises. In using argument (1) to establish that sense percep­
tion is reliable, one is already, implicitly or explicitly, taking sense 
perception to be reliable. The need for this presupposition does not 
result from syntactic or semantic considerations: it is a result of 
neither the logical form of the argument nor the meaning of the 
premises. It is, rather, the result of our epistemic situation as hu­
mans. 21 It is an "epistemic presupposition, " and the circularity to 
which it is tied is an "epistemic circularity. " 
Arguments such as (I) can be used to justify the belief that sense 
perception is reliable only if some principle of justification such as 
(2) is true:22 
(2) If one believes that p on the basis of its sensorily appear­
ing to one that p, and one has no overriding reasons to 
the contrary, one is justified in believing that p. 
All it takes to be justified in a perceptual belief, if (2) is true, is that 
the belief come from one's experience in a certain way, given the 
absence of overriding conditions militating against the truth of the 
belief. One need not also be justified in accepting (2) or any related 
or similar reliability principle. One does not have to be justified in 
believing the conclusion of (I) in order for (I) to provide justifica­
tion for one's belief in that conclusion. Thus (I) can be used to 
justify one's belief that sense perception is reliable, if some princi­
ple such as (2) is true. Furthermore, (I) continues to provide justi­
fication even if one moves from implicitly assuming that sense per­
ception is reliable to being explicitly aware that one is assuming it. 
The force of the argument is not lost by one becoming more clear 
about where the force lies, says Alston. 
Such epistemically circular arguments cannot be used rationally 
to produce conviction that sense perception (or any other belief 
source) is reliable. One already has that conviction by practical as­
sumption. Nor, says Alston, can one provide what he calls "full 
reflective justification," where he means that not only is a given 
belief p shown to be justified but all other beliefs used in the justi­
fication of p are shown to be justified. When a belief is fully reflec-
2 1 .  Ibid., p. 328. 
22. Ibid. , p. 3 3  r. 
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tively justified, "no questions are left over as to whether the subject 
is justified in accepting some premise that is used at some stage of 
the justification. "23 There are limits on justification; one cannot jus­
tify everything at once. To do so, or at least to attempt to do so, 
does involve one in logical circularity. To demand full reflective 
justification is to demand too much. To recognize the limitations 
on our reasoning power is simply to recognize the humble state of 
our epistemic situation. It does not commit one to the more radical 
forms of skepticism. 
Thus, according to Alston, not only can one justify one's belief 
that a source is reliable but one can be justified in it. By way of 
summary, it is worth quoting Alston at length: 
We are interested not only in the prospects of an argument like [(r)] 
being used to justify belief in [the reliability of sense perception], but 
also in the prospects of one's being justified in believing [that sense 
perception is reliable] by virtue of the reasons embodied in the 
premises of [(r)]. The distinction being invoked here is that between 
the activity of justifying a belief that p by producing some argument 
for p, and the state of being justified in believing that p. Of course one 
way to get into that state is to justify one's belief by an argument. 
We have already seen that this is possible with [(r)]. However, it is a 
truism in epistemology that one may be justified in believing that p, 
even on the basis of reasons, without having argued from those rea­
sons top, and thus without having engaged in the activity of justify­
ing the belief. Since we do not often engage in such activities we 
would have precious few justified beliefs if this were not the case. 
Indeed, we have exploited this possibility in claiming that one may 
be justified in accepting the premises of [(r)] without having justified 
them by argument. If the latter were required one would have to 
appeal to [the claim that sense perception is reliable] as a premise, 
and the enterprise of justifying [that sense perception is reliable] 
would run into logical circularity. It even seems possible to be justi­
fied, on the basis of reasons, in believing that p without so much as 
being able to produce an argument from those reasons to p. It may 
be that the reasons are too complex, too subtle, or otherwise too 
deeply hidden (or the subject too inarticulate), for the subject to 
recover and wield those reasons. 24 
23. Ibid., p. 342. 
24. Ibid. , pp. 334-35. 
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3. Alstonian Justification Old and New 
What relationships hold between the older accounts of Je, ]nw• 
and Jns• on the one hand, and h and ]eg on the other? And what 
results can we expect for the claims of "Christian Experience and 
Christian Belief' and, in particular, the parity thesis, given the ar­
guments of "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic 
Justification"? 
I do not think a detailed correlation between the older notions­
from "Christian Experience and Christian Belief' -and the 
newer-from the other essays I have considered-is easy to pro­
vide. There are, however, some more or less general correlations. 
For example, Jn is clearly the ancestor of ]d, since both are ex­
plained in exactly the same terms. We can thus take Alston's con­
cern in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to be the same 
as that in "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic Jus­
tification";  that is, we can work on the premise that the former 
essay takes Jns and Jnw as accounts of justification which are in com­
petition with ]eg· All are possible accounts of the justification of 
beliefs from the epistemic point of view. 
What follows from this alignment? First, the arguments showing 
that ]di is not the best candidate for justification from the . epi­
stemic point of view seem to apply equally well to Jnw· This point 
does not, however, refute the argument of "Christian Experience 
and Christian Belief." One might still be Jnw in holding a belief p 
even though one does not have the best kind of epistemic justifica­
tion. And Je may remain out of the believer's reach. 
In the earlier work, however, Alston claims that one could never 
have sufficient reasons for taking a practice or its deliverances to be 
Je (even though they might be Je). He concludes there that, al­
though PP and CP could both be Je, the best we can have is Jnw for 
engaging in either of them. Thus Alston writes that, "if we are 
to have any chance of acquiring knowledge, we must simply go 
along with our natural reactions of trust with respect to at least 
some basic sources of belief, provided we lack sufficient reason for 
regarding them as unreliable."25 We must, that is, take Jnw as the 
best we can do and trust that it will lead us to the right practices-
25. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 19. 
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practices that are in fact Je· But why should we take Jnw beliefs and 
practices to move us toward Je? Other than that we have nowhere 
else to turn, Alston gives no reason in the earlier essay. He seems 
to have shifted his position on this matter in "Epistemic Circu­
larity, " however, for he argues that one can both justify a belief 
that a practice is reliable and be justified in such a belief (even if one 
has not attempted to justify it). And this is done, importantly, on 
the basis of reasons. 
If Alston is right in the claims of "Epistemic Circularity" and 
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " then perhaps his claim in 
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' that one cannot be Jns 
in engaging in a basic practice is incorrect. One can, according to 
his later argument, have good reasons to engage in a basic practice, 
even though those reasons are circular. And Alston himself says 
that, "if I set out to discover whether a practice is Je, that is, 
whether it is reliable, then I will also be investigating the question 
of whether one could be Jns in engaging in that practice. "26 Once one 
discovers that there are reasons to think the practice reliable and 
that those reasons are one's own, then surely one finds not just that 
one could be Jns in engaging in the practice but that one is Jns in 
engaging in it, that is, unless Jns requires that the reasons for sup­
posing a practice reliable be somehow outside the practice itself. It 
is possible that Alston did think, at the writing of the earlier essay, 
that the reasons must not be circular, that they must be outside the 
practice. The whole notion of a practice being basic relies on the 
presence of circularity in attempts at justification. But even if Al­
ston did think that at an earlier time, he apparently became con­
vinced that some kinds of circularity-such as epistemic circu­
larity-are acceptable means to epistemic justification. 
So it appears that one can be Jns in engaging in a basic practice­
that is, that one has some reasons for taking a basic practice to be 
reliable. And it is a clear inference from "Epistemic Circularity" 
and "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" that one can be Jns in a 
practice, at least as far as having reasons is concerned. What is not 
clear is whether one has met the normative demands of Jns simply 
by having reasons or whether some further conditions need to be 
met. I suspect there are further conditions, but Alston does not 
26. Ibid., p. II7. 
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specify what they are. But even if he did, would it be worth find­
ing out about those conditions if, in fact, normative or deontologi­
cal accounts of justification do not give us what we desire in terms 
of the epistemic point of view? If one could provide reasons for the 
claim that a practice is reliable, would one not want to understand 
those reasons as providing evaluative justification for the practice 
rather than normative or deontological justification? I believe so. 
The really important question, from the epistemic point of view, is 
whether one can be }eg in a belief that a practice is reliable. I believe 
Alston provides the structure that permits an affirmative reply to 
this question. 
How would the basic structure of arguments for a belief that 
some practice is reliable look? Generalizing from Alston's example, 
such an argument would rely on some principle such as this: 
(3) If S believes that p on the basis of p's being delivered to S 
by epistemic practice EP, and S has no overriding reasons 
to the contrary, Sis justified in believing that p. 
Given the truth of (3), S can justifiably hold propositions such as 
this: 
(4) At t, S formed the EP belief that p, and p. 
Now, S need not be justified in holding the epistemic principle (3). 
Such a requirement would lead to logical circularity. But because 
of that principle, S can be justified in holding propositions having 
the same form as (4). But then S can string together propositions 
in the form of (4) to produce an inductive argument to the conclu­
sion that EP is reliable. 
But what happens if the justification being demanded is of the }eg 
type? Let us call the belief that some practice is reliable R. For S to 
be }eg in believing R, it would have to be the case that S's believing 
that R, as S does, is a good thing from the epistemic point of view, 
in that S' s belief that R is based on adequate grounds and S lacks 
sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary. This is simply an ap­
plication of Alston's general account of }eg· Let us assume that 
there are no overriding conditions. Thus what is important is that 
S have adequate grounds for believing R. According to Alston's 
account, to have adequate grounds for a belief such as R, one need 
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only have adequate (although epistemically circular) reasons. So let 
us say that at t1 the practice in question generates belief Pt. at t2 it 
generates p2, and so on. Suppose further that 97 percent of these 
beliefs are true. S can thus conclude that the practice is reliable, and 
hence S is justified in believing R. 
Now, what we are after is whether this justification is the kind 
specified by the account of ]eg· It is as long as inductive reasoning as a 
source of belief is in fact reliable. Is it? One way to answer that ques­
tion is to explore whether the belief that it is reliable is Jeg· But 
one's initial justification of R does not rely on whether one has 
justified the further belief that induction is reliable. One need only 
be justified in that belief. So it appears that one can be ]eg in a belief 
that a practice is reliable. 
Not only can one be ]eg in the belief that the practice is reliable, 
but by extension it seems that one can be ]eg in engaging in the 
practice itself. Here is an account of Jeg applied to practices rather 
than beliefs: 
Grounds* Je (J�) S is J� in engaging in an epistemic prac­
tice EP iff S's engaging in EP, as S does, is a good thing 
from the epistemic point of view, in that S's engaging in 
EP is based on adequate grounds and S lacks sufficient 
overriding reasons to the contrary. 
Here something needs to be said about the notion of adequate 
grounds for engaging in an epistemic practice. Alston says that a 
ground for a belief is "the sort of item on which a belief can be 
based. " But basing a belief on a ground is not obviously the same 
as basing one's engaging in a practice on a ground. Nevertheless, 
perhaps it is enough if we piggyback the notion of grounds for 
engaging in a practice on the grounds for a belief that that practice 
is reliable. (Here we have a sufficient but perhaps not a necessary 
condition for grounds for engaging in a practice. There may be 
other ways of having grounds for engaging in a practice besides a 
[ justified] belief that the practice is reliable. ) So, the sort of thing 
that one can base one's engaging in a practice on is a belief that in 
turn has grounds. Add to all this that these latter grounds are ade­
quate and by extension that the grounds for engaging in a practice 
are adequate. In the case under consideration, what would the ade-
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quate grounds be? Surely by Alston's own account, if one is justi­
fied via an argument that rests on reliably formed beliefs (even if it 
is epistemically circular) in the belief that the practice is reliable, 
then one is justified in engaging in the practice. This all seems con­
sonant with Alston's claim that "a particular belief is justified if and 
only if we are justified in engaging in a certain epistemic practice. "Zl 
Although this claim does not demand that one is justified in a belief 
p if and only if one is justified in the second-order belief that the 
practice that generates p is justified, my argument shows that one 
can both justify and be justified in holding the second-order belief 
and thus that engaging in the practice believed to be justified is 
justified and hence that beliefs generated by the practice, such as p, 
are justified. Although not required by his claim, the justification 
of the second-order belief (in the reliability of the practice) seems 
to show that one is justified in engaging in the practice and thus, to 
borrow Alston's metaphor, is icing on the epistemological cake. 
So it appears on this interpretation that one can be )eg in the 
belief that a practice is reliable. By extension, one can be J� in 
engaging in that practice. I noted above that the question of Jns 
may be less important than "Christian Experience and Christian 
Belief' suggests, given that we could have )eg for a practice. Nev­
ertheless, it seems that one could also be Jns in engaging in a basic 
practice. One already has the reasons needed. All that is required 
beyond those reasons is whatever it takes to meet the normative 
demands. Given that those are met, one could have Jns for the be­
lief that a practice is reliable. Thus one could be Jns in engaging in a 
practice and thus, according to Alston's own argument, one could 
be Jns in engaging in PP. This is quite a different result from that 
suggested in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " So, by 
Alston's later arguments, one could be both J� and Jns in engaging 
in PP, not only Jnw in so doing. 
This conclusion raises several questions about PTA. Although 
the original version may be true-both CP and PP may be Jnw 
(here I am ignoring the background belief challenge)-much of 
our interest in PTA derives from the supposition that neither PP 
nor CP can do any better thanJnw· It appears that PP can do better, 
by Alston's own argument. Now the question is whether CP can 
27. Ibid., p. IIO. 
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do as well. Can a person be Jtg or Jns in engaging in CP? Could 
Alston suggest a new, and stronger, version of the parity thesis? 
Let us consider Jtg, since Alston claims that its near relative, ]eg• is 
the understanding of epistemic justification that has the most going 
for it from the epistemic point of view. Might Alston suggest, for 
example, the following: 
Parity Thesis Alston Strong (PT As): Under appropriate con­
ditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP 
are J1g. 
Might he then continue by claiming that PTAs is true? PP, it has 
been argued, can be Jtg. CP's having the same status rests on the 
provision of reasons for the reliability of CP. Can such reasons be 
given? 
4· A Challenge to Alston's Strong Parity Thesis 
One challenge to PT AS can be seen if we return to the argument 
presented above for the claim that one can be ]eg in believing that a 
practice is reliable and apply it to the question of CP's reliability. 
The resulting argument looks like this: for S to be ]eg. in believing 
that CP is reliable, it would have to be the case that S's believing 
that CP is reliable is a good thing from the epistemic point of 
view, in that S's believing that CP is reliable is based on adequate 
grounds and S lacks sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary. 
Assuming that there are no overriding conditions, what would the 
adequate grounds have to be for S's belief that CP is reliable to be 
]eg? One needs adequate (albeit epistemically circular) reasons. So 
let us say that CP produces beliefs p1, p2, p3, and so forth, and that 
these beliefs (or a large percentage of them) are true. At this point 
the argument appeals to induction to move from these beliefs to 
the general belief that CP is reliable. 
But here the argument runs afoul. With PP a large number of 
beliefs are generated, literally tens of thousands, so that the induc­
tive base for the general conclusion that PP is reliable is sufficiently 
strong to support the conclusion. But one must wonder, just when 
does an inductive argument become a strong one? How many be­
liefs does one need in the inductive base? Is there a sufficiently large 
base of beliefs generated by CP? In some cases perhaps there are, 
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but one suspects that often the inductive base is not strong enough. 
How often does the Christian believer employ CP (or how often 
does CP work in her)? And does the believer trust her ability to use 
CP well enough to trust its deliverances? These are important is­
sues, but there are more pressing questions to ask. 
First, it appears that any attempt to produce an overall justifica­
tory argument for the reliability of a practice appeals to an induc­
tive subargument; that is, the inductive subargument is essential to 
the overall argument. No substitution is available. Second, the ap­
peal to induction assumes that the belief-forming practice is some­
thing we can test by applying it more than once. Third, the use of 
induction rests on the assumption that the things about which the 
induction is made are regular and predictive. Since the last two 
points are intimately connected, I deal with them more or less to­
gether. 
Of the first point, let me say that Alston's subargument is an 
inductive track-record argument. Is the inductive track-record sub­
argument essential? The first point to make is that, even if it is not, 
Alston's argument uses one. As far as the argument I have con­
structed (and now criticize) follows Alston's reasoning, if my argu­
ment is successful, I have at least shown that PT As cannot be de­
fended by that kind of argument. But then how could it be 
defended? There needs to be some positive argument. Perhaps 
there are other kinds of inductive arguments to which one might 
appeal-an inference to the best explanation, for example. But the 
points I make here about God's unpredictability seem to infect all 
inductive subarguments, of the track-record variety or not. And so 
I cast the following comments in general terms about induction. 
What of noninductive arguments? It is hard to see what they 
might be, in this case. To avoid logical (but allow epistemic) circu­
larity, it is hard to see that any premise that allows a deductive 
move to the needed conclusion is forthcoming. Alston begins with 
a practical assumption of reliability, and this gets the argument off 
the ground. But if one begins with practicality alone, one ends 
with practicality alone if the logical moves are deductive. So it 
looks as if an inductive subargument of some type is needed. 
Induction is an epistemic practice in which we appeal to past 
states of affairs and infer that these will continue into the future or 
we appeal to the presence of certain qualities or properties in ob-
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jects and infer that these will be present in the future, and the like. 
In other words, induction assumes that the objects with which 
it deals do not change, at least radically, from one moment to 
the next, or that the changes themselves are regularly repeating 
changes, and that a good case can be made from the past into the 
future. PP likewise deals with objects (or changes) that are regular 
and predictive. It is natural, in fact, to link our practice of induc­
tion to the practice of perception, understanding the two as rising 
together in our cognitive past. Although not the same thing, in­
duction and PP make similar assumptions about their subject mat­
ters. The key assumption for our purposes is that the objects with 
which they deal are predictable. Thus, since both PP and induction 
work well in their dealings with the physical world, the appeal to 
inductive principles to show the reliability of PP is both natural 
and, it seems, legitimate. It is, as Alston admits, built into PP that 
the objects that are its central concern are the kind of objects about 
which predictions can be made. Predictions are likewise the heart­
beat of induction. With these predictions we can anticipate and 
control, to some extent, physical objects. 
With CP, however, the connections with induction are much 
less clear. If, for example, the applicability of induction to a set of 
objects assumes that those objects do not change (in important 
ways) over time, or that any changes are predictable, and yet God 
does change (at least in unpredictable ways in his actions toward 
us), of what use is an inductive argument to show that the practice 
through which we have access to God-CP-is reliable? The issue 
here is really one of the nature of the practice as well as of the 
objects the practice supposedly accesses. With PP, the practice's 
ostensible predictive nature cannot be separated from the ostensible 
nature of the objects with which it deals. Of course one can safely 
infer from the past activity of this or that physical object to its 
future; that is part and parcel of the conceptual scheme of PP. On 
the other hand, if the nature of the practice is so intimately tied to 
the nature of its objects, and God is not predictable, then why 
would CP be predictable? It is not, as Alston admits. But then in 
what way can one appeal to an inductive argument to show that 
CP is reliable? Unlike stones and trees, God is not predictable; we 
cannot assume he will be or act in the future as he was or did in the 
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past or that CP will give us access to him in the future as it has in 
the past. God and his activities are not capable of being anticipated 
or controlled. 28 
Does this mean simply that one does not have, or at least that 
one cannot count on, a large number of generated beliefs from 
which to infer inductively a claim of reliability, as I suggested ear­
lier? No, my suggestion here is stronger than that. I mean to say 
that no induction from the past engagements of CP can be used 
legitimately as an inductive base. It is part of the understanding of 
the world that is embedded in CP (or in which CP is embedded) 
that God does not have to give us any information. In fact, Alston 
argues that, given the assumptions that God is somewhat myste­
rious and that he has made us such that we cannot discern regu­
larities in his nature and activities, then "if an epistemic practice 
were to lead us to suppose that we had discovered regular patterns 
in the divine behavior or that divine activity is equally discernible 
by all, that would be a reason for regarding the practice as unreli­
able. "29 If the assumption about the indiscernibility of regularity in 
God's nature and activities is correct, then how could one safely 
infer from the past deliverances of CP that it is reliable? And if the 
inductive subargument is irreplaceable in the overall justificatory 
argument, then a belief that CP is reliable cannot be justified by 
that larger argument. 
Alston has suggested in correspondence that my discussion does 
not take into account that, whereas "induction concerns the rela­
tions between beliefs and facts that make the beliefs true (where 
they are true), what is unpredictable is the object the beliefs are 
about. So that it is one thing that is unpredictable (God) and an­
other thing that is the topic of the induction (truth about beliefs 
28. There is a potential problem with this suggestion, since it is a mainstream 
belief of Christians that God is constant and dependable. How is one to square the 
(apparent) nonpredictability of God with his purported dependability and con­
stancy? I do not know how to resolve this problem except to suggest that, even if 
God is ultimately or finally dependable, nothing we know about him gives us 
insight into how he will carry out this dependability. It does not, in short, seem 
obviously contradictory to say that God is dependable but nonpredictable or that 
he is faithful but full of surprises. My challenge deals only with the apparent ele­
ment of surprise in God's ways of dealing with humanity. 
29. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 29. 
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about God when formed in a certain way). "30 This distinction is a 
good one. Let us see how it affects my argument. 
An inductive subargument for the reliability of CP, following 
Alston's pattern, looks something like this: 
(5) 1. At ft. S1 formed the CP belief that Pt. and p1. 
2. At t2, S2 formed the CP belief that p2, and p2• 
Therefore, CP is a reliable source of belief. 
Alston's note calls attention to the fact that the basis for the induc­
tion is the relationship between the conjuncts of the premises, and 
the issue is not, therefore, one of predictability or nonpredic­
tability. The move to the generalization is not based directly on the 
facts about the object of the belief (in this case God) but on the fact 
that the beliefs generated by CP are true. So it does not matter, for 
the efficacy of the induction, whether the objects of the beliefs are 
predictable or not. 
Although I agree with Alston's basic point that the induction 
itself is based on the relationship between the conjuncts of the 
premises, there remains something curious about CP. This feature 
of CP calls special attention to the object of the beliefs generated 
by CP in an inductive argument supporting CP's reliability. PP is a 
practice over which we have some control. If we do not wish to 
form visual beliefs, we can close our eyes. If we do not wish to 
form auditory beliefs, we can plug our ears. And so forth. Even 
though we are constantly bombarded, during our waking hours, 
with sensory information, there are certain measures we can take 
to control how PP works with that information. The corollary to 
this point is that generally the objects about which PP generates 
beliefs are always present to us. They are constant and predictably 
so. Thus we know what to do to engage in PP. We also know 
perfectly well what it would be to use PP to generate beliefs and 
then to reuse PP to validate those same beliefs. But it is less than 
clear that we know the same about CP. Even if we do have beliefs 
30. Personal letter dated November 26, 1990. 
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delivered to us by CP, it, unlike PP, is not the kind of practice we 
can call up on demand. We cannot simply turn our head in the 
right direction and use or apply CP. Having received some infor­
mation by sight, I can return again to that spot and use sight to 
validate the original belie( But what do I do having received the 
information that God wants me to spend most of my time on 
philosophical theology rather than other philosophical concerns? 
How do I reuse CP to test that belief? 
Perhaps there are certain things the Christian can do. For exam­
ple, one subpractice of CP may be reading Scripture. Insofar as it 
is, the Christian can pick up the Bible and read it, just as with PP 
one can open one's eyes and look again. When we open our eyes 
and turn our head in the right direction we can, more or less, trust 
that our sight gives us the information needed to validate our ear­
lier belief. But God need not reveal himself to us today when we 
read the Scriptures, and thus the testability of CP lacks the kind of 
repeatability of PP. And this brings us to my main reply to Al­
ston's criticism. The objects of beliefs generated by PP do not do 
anything to lead us to engage in PP. There is no conscious decision 
or motivation on their part to initiate PP for us. This is not true 
with CP. Presumably God must initiate CP. The unpredictability 
of God, therefore, indicates that no inductive move from CP-gen­
erated beliefs and their corresponding truth-making facts can pro­
vide sufficient grounds for concluding that CP is reliable (or will 
be reliable in the future). CP may work in entirely different ways 
each times in operates. A lack of predictability on God's part does 
lead to the failure of the inductive argument needed to show CP 
reliable. 
Furthermore, the predictability of the objects of PP beliefs is pre­
cisely what makes the repeatability of our engaging in PP possible. 
This repeatability allows for a kind of commitment to PP's re­
liability that in turn gets the inductive argument going. Here I shift 
to discuss the premises of Alston's argument, and hence it is Al­
ston's "practical assumption" that is at stake. The move from the 
generation of true perceptual beliefs (from experience and PP) to 
the claim that PP is reliable depends on the practical assumption 
that PP is reliable. This assumption must only be practical, of 
course; otherwise one is involved in a logical rather than epistemic 
circle. But how can one make even the practical assumption? We 
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make it, I believe, because the deliverances of PP are so well con­
firmed by the past predictive power of induction and PP. It is thi� 
(predictive kind of) confirmation that "indicates" ("betokens, " 
"manifests") PP's reliability in the first place. 31 But this confirma­
tion is internal to the practice itself: induction seems either part and 
parcel of PP or so intimately connected that one cannot engage in 
induction without relying on PP (or other practices dealing with 
predictable objects) and its internal assumptions. Thus one should 
not view the (predictive) confirmation of the practice's deliverance� 
as independent grounds or reasons for taking the practice to be 
reliable. Nevertheless, confirmation may generate an initial trust in 
the practice and hence the practical assumption is not irrational. I 
am sure Alston would not take just any practice-let us say my 
taking the pain in my knee to indicate that a Canadian hockey team 
will take the Stanley Cup-as a practice one can practically assume 
to be reliable. The presence of a reliability indicator is what sug­
gests the practical assumption in the first place. 
So, in addition to the move from the premises to the conclusion 
relying on the predictive nature of the objects, the internal (predic­
tive) confirmation of beliefs also depends on the regularity of the 
objects over which the practice generating those beliefs ranges. 
With CP such (predictive) confirmation appears not to be present. 
The objects of the practice (God and his activities) are not regular 
or predictable. Insofar as they are not, the practical assumption 
does not seem plausible. There is no indicator of reliability to sug­
gest that one make a practical assumption. So, although one need 
not go on to show that induction itself is a reliable source of belief, 
one must have an argument with a strong enough set of beliefs to 
make a sound inductive move. CP appears to lack such a base, for 
the practical assumption of CP's reliability does not have the net­
work of confirmation that the related PP assumption has. Thus, 
although PP is J�-one can generate an inductive, albeit episte­
mically circular, argument for the reliability of PP-CP appears not 
to be, since the requisite argument slips in some assumptions about 
the nature of CP and its objects which are not true of that practice. 
3 r .  See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " p. 1 25, for a full 
explanation of these terms. See Chapter IO, and Mark S. MCLeod, "Can Belief in 
God Be Confirmed?" Religious Studies 24 (1988): 3 1 1-23, for further developmen1 
of this and a non predictive kind of confirmation. 
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I am suggesting, then, that although there may be an argument 
justifying the belief that PP is reliable, insofar as that argument 
rests on induction there can be no parallel argument for CP. There 
are two points to my argument. First, because of the unpredictable 
nature of the object of CP, one cannot go from the premises 
(which contain truth claims about CP's deliverances) to the conclu­
sion about CP' s reliability. Second, not even the initial practical 
assumption about CP's reliability is well founded, since, once 
again, the nature of the object of CP does not allow for the internal 
confirmatory platform that would lead one to make the practical 
assumption in the first place. These two issues are connected, be­
cause both rely on the unpredictability of God. So what suggests a 
lack of force behind the practical assumption for CP turns out ulti­
mately to challenge the move from the premises, even if true, to 
the conclusion. 
Does Alston have a response? He admits (and, in fact, makes 
"epistemological hay out of') the fact that PP has confirmation and 
predictive power whereas CP does not. On the basis of this kind of 
observation, says Alston, some have rejected the reliability of CP. 
He goes on to argue, however, that although confirmation and 
predictive power are indicative of reliability, they are not necessary 
for reliability. Can Alston use a related response against my sug­
gestions, claiming, for example, that CP need not have confirma­
tion and yet can still be legitimately practically assumed to be reli­
able? I think not. It is true that a practice could be reliable and its 
deliverances not be confirmed. Still, the argument under consid­
eration, taken as a whole, relies on induction. Inductive arguments 
can have success only where the base allows a predictive move 
from the past to the future. With a well-confirmed base such 
moves are plausible. As we have seen, this issue arises at two 
stages, with the practical assumption and with the move from 
premises to conclusion. With CP, however, the predictive applica­
tion to future cases appears risky both with regard to the main 
argument and with regard to the initial confirmation that might 
suggest the practical assumption in the first place. The predictive 
repeatability simply seems absent. What other reliability indicator 
is available? None, and thus, insofar as Alston's argument requires 
induction, we cannot make an appeal to the argument to show that 
CP is Jfg. Alston's move earlier to ignore CP's lack of confirma-
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tion, and his subsequent claim that CP can be Jnw' does not rely on 
an inductive argument. In fact, Jnw does not rely on argument at 
all. In the case of Jnw' Alston's concern is with reasons against the 
reliability of CP, and lacking confirmation and predictability does 
not constitute a reason against reliability. But with J!g the case is 
different, for now we are dealing with a lack of reasons for re­
liability. J!g demands positive reasons and those simply are not, 
and perhaps cannot be, provided by CP. So PT AS appears not to be 
true. 
Alston does say that CP has its own internal self-support. Does 
this help him with PTAs? CP's self-support comes in terms of spir­
itual development which, Alston suggests, is internal to the prac­
tice. What is spiritual development? 
CMP [CP], including the associated Christian scheme that has been 
built up over the centuries, generates, among much else, the belief 
that God has made certain promises of the destiny that awaits us if 
we follow the way of life enjoined on us by Christ. We are told that 
if we will turn from our sinful ways, reorder our priorities, take a 
break from preoccupation with our self-centered aims long enough 
to open ourselves to the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit, then 
we will experience a transformation into the kind of non possessive, 
nondefensive, loving, caring, and sincere persons God has destined 
us to become. 
This brief account does not do full justice to the notion of spiritual 
development. Nevertheless, some Christians do develop in these 
ways, and this provides some type of self-support for CP. Even so, 
if we pay attention to the ways Christians treat their spiritual 
development, we note that there is no predictive guarantee that 
someone will mature as a Christian believer. Alston himself writes 
that this development happens "not immediately and not without 
many ups and downs. 32 This is no surprise, for we are dealing with 
humans and their foibles, as well as with a God about whom even 
believers are hesitant to predict things. And there is, of course, 
much more to be said here. 
But the main point is that spiritual development is also un­
predictable and that this indicates the unlikelihood that even an 
32. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 252. 
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inductive argument bolstered with spiritual development as inter­
nal support can be used to move one to a justified belief in re­
liability. 
Since the inductive argument is so prominent in the overall justi­
ficatory argument, its absence effectively kills the justificatory ar­
gument and hence the claim that one can be ]eg in a belief that CP 
is reliable. Can one use the self-support of spiritual formation as an 
indicator of reliability, that is, as enough for a practical assumption 
of reliability? Perhaps, for spiritual development does occur among 
those involved in CP, and there is a kind of confirmation that at­
taches to CP because of the spiritual development of its practi­
tioners. This is not a predictive kind of confirmation, however, 
and an inductive argument based on it would be shaky at best. I 
have more to say about the notion of a nonpredictive confirmation 
in Chapters 10 and 1 1 ,  and I postpone detailed discussion until 
then. 
I believe it is safe to conclude that PT As is false. What about the 
Jns of CP? For the reasons presented against the ]eg of CP, its Jns 
must be rejected as well. Thus although PP may be, according to 
some of Alston's work, Jns• CP cannot be. And in the case of CP, 
one cannot know that it is ]eg· 
I have argued that some of Alston's more recent work militates 
against the conclusions of his earlier work. A stronger parity thesis 
emerges from this more recent work. But PT AS fails because of a 
lack of inductive support for CP's reliability. There is one final 
consideration that raises serious questions about PT AS· I turn to 
explore Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology in the 
next chapter. 
